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The Federal Republic of Germany v. The
United States of America: The Individual
Right to Consular Access
Daniel J. Lehman*
I. Introduction
Imagine you are in a foreign jail. You have no understanding
of the legal process or what rights you may or may not have. You
may not have a working knowledge of the language of your
interrogators or even know why you are being questioned. You do
not know what or what not to tell them. You are without friends
or resources. You are completely at the mercy of the unknown.'
Cesar Roberto Fierro, who now sits on death row in Texas, faced a
very similar situation.2
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1996, Michigan State
University. I would like to thank Dennis A. Hachler of Pendleton, Oregon, for
introducing me to and advising me on this topic. I would also like to thank Mark
Warren of Amnesty International Canada, Sandra Babcock of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, and Professor David Weissbrodt of the University of Minnesota Law
School for their valuable advice and expertise on this issue. I would like to thank
Yolanda Guzman and Mary Schug for their valuable assistance with this project, as
well as my parents and Professor Donald Marshall for their support and
encouragement.
1. This hypothetical illustrates the earliest and most basic issues faced by a
detained noncitizen, not only in a country with a stereotypically corrupt military
government, but in the United States as well. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty
Int'l, Torture-A Modern Day Plague (Oct. 18, 2000) (reporting that "torture or ill-
treatment by state agents occurred in over 150 countries and was widespread in
more than 70," and that from 1997 to 2000, people have "died as a result of torture
in over 80 countries"), http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/THEMES/TORTURE. One
could imagine how a citizen of one of these nations would perceive her situation
when in the custody of U.S. authorities and unaware of the safeguards afforded to
those within the U.S. criminal justice system.
2. See Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Mr. Fierro
was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the 1979 murder of an El Paso
taxi cab driver. See id. Police obtained a confession from Mr. Fierro by informing
him that his parents were in the custody of the Ciudad Juarez police and subject to
a particularly notorious police commandante, thereby causing him to fear the worst
for his parents. Brief of Amicus Curiae United Mexican States in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-9, Fierro v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.
1989); see also Exparte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting
that the trial court in a state habeas corpus proceeding found a strong likelihood
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This scenario becomes somewhat less formidable when the
detainee has the advice and backing of his or her nation's
consulate.3  The consulate will typically provide information
concerning the receiving State's 4 legal system and provide support
for the defendant. 5 This guidance helps ensure the protection of
the sending State's citizens within the legal boundaries of the
receiving State. 6 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Vienna Convention) established a standard protocol to
facilitate these consular functions. 7
Law enforcement officials in the United States do not
consistently honor Vienna Convention obligations, and U.S. courts
have been reluctant to give the necessary effect to the treaty to
achieve compliance with its obligations.8 The reasons courts have
that the confession was coerced by joint action of the Ciudad Juarez police and the
El Paso police).
3. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ASSISTANCE
TO CITIZENS ARRESTED ABROAD, at http://travel.state.gov/arrest.html (1997)
(providing a list of services for U.S. citizens arrested abroad); see also Gregory Dean
Gisvold, Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of Foreign Nationals
Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REV. 771,
783-84 & nn.51-54 (1994) (noting that most countries have procedures in place for
consular authorities to provide assistance to their citizens when detained by foreign
authorities).
4. See generally Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. This Comment will use the Vienna Convention
terminology, which refers to the State of which the nonresident detainee is a citizen
as the "sending State." Id. The "receiving State" refers to the nation in which the
citizen is present at the time of detention. Id.
5. See, e.g., id. (defining consular functions).
6. For example, consular authorities representing a noncitizen defendant in
the United States could provide an explanation of the right to have legal
representation provided. See, e.g., People v. Medina, No. 97 CR 307, Division B
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1998), http://www.state.co.us/defenders/Library/Mata-
Medina/Antonio%2OMata-Medina%200rder.html (stating that the defendant
wanted, but could not afford, an attorney and did not understand that the State
would provide one at no charge); see also Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th
Cir. 1996) (noting that the Canadian government "require[s] that the Canadian
consul obtain case-related information if requested by the arrestee to the extent
that it cannot otherwise be obtained by the arrestee").
7. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. at 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-94. The Convention's Optional Protocol on
Disputes grants jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice to resolve all
disputes arising from the Vienna Convention and to give an authoritative
interpretation to the Vienna Convention's provisions. Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
8. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-78 (1998) (holding that there
was an Article 36 violation but that the claim was precluded because it was not
raised in the state court); see also United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192,
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given for denying relief for violations of convention obligations
include procedural default, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and
that the treaty does not stipulate an individual right to relief.9
Courts have looked to the State Department use of informational
resources as providing adequate protection against Vienna
Convention violations. 10 The State Department's acknowledgment
of the importance of compliance with Article 36 obligations is
evident from its publication of a handbook instructing law
enforcement officials on the notification of consular rights." The
198 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Vienna Convention does not create an
individually enforceable right for an arrested foreign national to consult with
consular officials); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that a violation of the Vienna Convention's consular
notification requirement does not require suppression of subsequently obtained
evidence in a criminal proceeding against a noncitizen defendant); Commonwealth
v. Quaranibal, 763 A.2d 941, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that the Article 36
claim was precluded because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, but that
even if it had been raised, the treaty does not confer individual rights and that
appellant suffered no prejudice.)
9. See sources cited supra note 8.
10. See Lomnbera-Canorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887-88. In this split decision of the
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, the majority pointed out the State Department's role
in investigating and implementing treaty provisions. See id. at 887. The court
stated that "the fact that the State Department is willing to and in fact does work
directly with law enforcement to ensure compliance detracts in this instance from
the traditional justification for the exclusionary rule." Id. at 887-88. The court
noted that the framers of the Vienna Convention could not have had the unique
character of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in mind, and therefore such remedies
as the exclusionary rule could not have been intended. See id. at 886. The court
cited Aiizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1995), for the proposition that "[tihe
exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
against future violations. . . through the rule's general deterrent effect. As with
any remedial device, the rule's application has been restricted to those instances
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Lombera-
Carnorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888. The dissent countered by characterizing the State
Department's practice in this area as being "equivalent to securing enforcement by
a toothless, clawless lion." Id. at 888 (Boochever, J., dissenting). The dissent
further noted that suffering imprisonment to "which [defendants] would not have
been subjected had their rights been observed... hardly conforms to the...
principles embodied in the United States Constitution." Id. See also infra notes
135-136 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of evidence as a remedy for
government misconduct).
11. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR
NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO ASSIST THEM, at
http://travel.state.gov/consul-notify.html (1998). The handbook lists the Article 36
obligations and states that "[w]hen foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they
must be advised of the right to have their consular officials notified." Id. at pt. 1.
The handbook emphasizes the importance of notification as it would pertain to U.S.
citizens abroad:
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Justice Department also affirmatively acknowledges that
notification of consular rights is required of its agents. 12
This issue is of great importance in the wake of the
September 11 attacks on the United States and the ensuing "War
on Terrorism." 13 As of January 11, 2002, law enforcement officials
within the United States have detained more than 700 foreign
nationals on immigration violations or other charges. 14 Some
consulates do not even know the number of their citizens who are
currently in detention. 15
U.S. violations of Article 36 first came to the attention of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague in a proceeding
instituted by Paraguay concerning one of its citizens, Angel
Francisco Breard. 16 The ICJ found the case within its jurisdiction
and issued an order requesting the United States to refrain from
executing Breard pending its final decision. 17 Subsequent to the
U.S. Supreme Court's denial of Breard's habeas corpus petition 18
and his execution, Paraguay discontinued its ICJ proceedings
against the U.S.1 9
These are mutual obligations that also pertain to American citizens
abroad. In general, you should treat a foreign national as you would want
an American citizen to be treated in a similar situation in a foreign
country. This means prompt, courteous notification to the foreign national
of the possibility of consular assistance, and prompt courteous notification
to the foreign national's nearest consular officials so that they can provide
whatever consular services they deem appropriate.
Id. See also infra note 81 (noting the use of the above pamphlet as a defense before
the ICJ to show U.S. compliance with Vienna Convention obligations).
12. See Notification of Consular Officers upon the Arrest of Foreign Nationals,
28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Evan Thomas et al., Justice Kept in the Dark, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10,
2001, at 37 (noting the effects of the antiterrorism dragnet on noncitizens in the
U.S. following the September 11 attacks).
14. Tamar Lewin, A Nation Challenged: The Detainees; Rights Groups Press for
Names of Muslims Held in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A9.
15. See, e.g., William Glaberson, A Frustrated A.C.L.U. Tries to Guide
Consulates Through a Thicket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at All (reporting that the
deputy consul for Morocco stated that his consulate is unaware of both the number
and identity of Moroccan citizens in detention).
16. See Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Apr. 9).
17. See id. at 258; see also infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the Supreme Court's treatment of Article 36 in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998)).
18. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
19. See Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, 427 (Nov. 10).
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In LaGrand Case,20 the ICJ had occasion to interpret and
address Article 36 issues when Germany brought an action
against the United States subsequent to the execution of two of its
citizens in Arizona. This Comment will look at the issues the ICJ
addressed, analyze its holdings within the context of U.S.
jurisprudence, and determine the effects on similarly situated
defendants in the future. This discussion will include issues
arising in many Article 36 cases, including death penalty cases. 21
Section II of this Comment will provide a background of
Article 36, and detail the Article and related jurisprudence in the
United States before LaGrand.22 Section III will examine the
LaGrand case and the issues the ICJ decided. 23 Section IV will
apply the holdings of the ICJ to previous U.S. court decisions to
determine what changes should result from the ICJ's
interpretation of Article 36 in LaGrand.24 Section IV will also look
at cases in which courts found that an individual right to
notification exists.2 5 Finally, Section IV will address the remedies
that may be available to establish a policy of compliance with
Vienna Convention obligations and to preserve fair and adequate
access to the due process of the laws that is the hallmark of the
U.S. legal system.2 6
This Comment will show that Article 36 creates an individual
right for a noncitizen in U.S. custody to receive consular assistance
from his or her consulate that, when violated, often infringes upon
constitutional protections.2 7 The United States should observe its
obligation under Article 36 to ensure that noncitizen defendants
receive the protections guaranteed citizen defendants in U.S.
courts. Observation of Article 36 does not create any "special"
rights upon which the noncitizen defendant may call; it simply
20. LaGrand Case, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 40 I.L.M. 1069 (June 27, 2001).
21. See John Quigley, Execution of Foreign Nationals in the United States:
Pressure from Foreign Governments Against the Death Penalty, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 589, 589-91 (1998). Half of the world's nations do not use capital
punishment, and none of the Western European nations do. Id. at 589. The United
States faces extensive opposition, especially from the Western European nations, to
its capital punishment practices. See id. at 589-91.
22. See infra notes 28-71 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 91-159 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text; see also infra note 49
(listing additional relevant cases).
26. See infra notes 135-159 and accompanying text.
27. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VIII; see also infra notes 97-159 and
accompanying text.
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helps secure the same treatment as the citizen defendant receives
in U.S. courts. This Comment will look at remedies which are
intended to preserve this fair and equal treatment expected in the
U.S. legal system.
II. Background
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
Optional Protocol on Disputes
The United Nations General Assembly convened the United
Nations Conference on Consular Relations in 1963 to establish and
codify a uniform consular protocol.28 Among the most important
contributions of the resulting Convention was a provision to
facilitate communication between detained individuals and their
consulates. 29 This issue was the subject of extensive debate, 30
resulting in the inclusion of Article 36 into the Vienna
Convention.3 '
28. See Luke T. Lee, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, INT'L
CONCILIATION, Jan. 1969, at 41, 41-47. The changing international political
climate following World War II brought the need for a uniform consular code to the
attention of the United Nations. Id. at 46-47.
29. See LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONsULAR RELATIONS 107
(1966).
30. See id. at 107-14. The provision in the Vienna Convention for consular
notification was one of the most hotly contested items at the convention. See id. at
107. Objections to a consular notification provision included: an administrative
burden may result for countries with large numbers of immigrants; individuals
may not want their country to be notified; some nations have laws requiring the
consent of the detained before a third party may be notified; the provision would
create a higher degree of protection than that afforded citizens of the receiving
country; and the right of a national from a sending State to communicate with her
consulate is not within the scope of the instant convention, but that of the
Declaration of Human Rights. See id. at 109-10. Many nations, including the
United States, strongly argued in support of a consular access provision, and
following a series of amendments, the Article was passed in its present form. See
id. at 111-14.
31. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states:
COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE SENDING STATE
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
[Vol. 20:313
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The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol on Disputes on
December 24, 1969.32 The six-year delay between the signing of
the treaty and ratification was due to executive branch
disagreement over the sufficiency of the standards of the consular
relations rules. 33  The United States did not believe the
Convention went far enough to ensure proper standards for
consular communication. 34
The Vienna Convention contains a built-in procedure for the
adjudication of disputes arising from the Convention provisions. 35
The Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes confers upon the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over the
interpretation of the treaty to the parties to the protocol. 36 The
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of
a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes
such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject
to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under
this Article are intended.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-
01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-94.
32. See id., 21 U.S.T. at 373.
33. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 568-69 nn.9-
16 (1997).
34. See id. at 569 & n.14. The executive branch preferred the bilateral treaties
that the United States had previously joined which provided higher standards for
consular accessibility. See id. Evidence from the Senate debate on ratification
explicitly stated that the standards set forth by the Convention were lower than
those for the bilateral agreements on consular relations to which the United States
was a party. See id. at 569 n.14 (citing 115 CONG. REC. S30,997 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1969) (statement of Sen. Fulbright)).
35. See Optional Protocol, supra note 7, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
36. See id. The preamble and Article I of the Protocol state the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice over disputes arising out of the Convention:
The States Parties to the present Protocol and to the Vienna Convention
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United States is a party to this Optional Protocol.3 7
When law enforcement seizes an individual in the United
States, he is entitled to a presumption of innocence38 and a
guarantee of the protections afforded by the Constitution. 39 Since
one of the main objectives of a consulate is to assure fair treatment
of its citizens abroad, this protection is unavailable when a
detainee's consular access is inhibited. 40  The importance of
consular access is especially evident in capital cases where access
to mitigating evidence may only be possible through consular
assistance. 41
of Consular Relations, hereinafter referred to as "the Convention", adopted
by the United Nations Conference held at Vienna from 4 March to 22 April
1963,
Expressing their wish to resort in all matters concerning them in
respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, unless some other form of settlement has been agreed upon by the
parties within a reasonable period,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to
the present Protocol.
Id. preamble and art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488.
37. See LEE, supra note 29, at 198-204. The United States, despite its
longstanding tradition of refusing to confer meaningful jurisdiction on an
international court, proposed a disputes clause to the Convention. See id. at 189-
90. The United States argued that a codification of international law would require
measures to ensure compliance. See id. at 199. The Convention concluded with the
present Optional Protocol. See id. at 204. The United States had effectively come
forth as an important proponent for the acceptance of the ICJ's jurisdiction over the
Convention. See id.
38. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993).
39. Two themes that consistently arise in Article 36 discussions are the rights
established under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment
protects a defendant from self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). The Sixth Amendment states that an accused
shall have the assistance of counsel in presenting his defense. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires a State to provide counsel for a criminal' defendant who
cannot afford representation. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
A corollary to this right is that counsel must render effective assistance. See Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56-59 (1932); Strickland v. Washington, 486 U.S. 668, 686
(1984).
40. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text (explaining the necessity of
consular assistance in obtaining from the sending State mitigating evidence that
would be otherwise unattainable).
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B. Article 36 Jurisprudence in the United States
United States v. Calderon-Medina42 was among the first cases
in which a defendant asserted an individual right to consular
notification and access.43 The Ninth Circuit held that individual
rights might flow from Article 36. 44 The court held that if
Calderon-Medina could show prejudice resulting from the
violation, then his deportation would be unlawful.
45
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue the following year in
United States v. Rangel-Gonzales.46 Rangel-Gonzales was not
informed of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate upon his
detention. 47 The court dismissed the charges, finding that the
Consulate could have assisted the defendant in a way that might
have favorably influenced the outcome of the case.
48
Courts have not decided whether the Vienna Convention
creates an individually enforceable right outside of the
42. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
43. See id. at 531.
44. See id. Despite arguments that the treaty was meant to benefit consular
efficiency, the court noted that:
[P]rotection of some interests of aliens as a class is a corollary to consular
efficiency. This is evident because consular functions listed in [Alrticle 5 of
the Convention include "helping and assisting nationals ... of the sending
State" and "representing or arranging appropriate representation for
nationals of the sending State before the tribunals and other authorities of
the receiving State ... where such nationals are unable ... to assume the
defenses of their rights and interests."
Id. at 531-32 n.6 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 30,945 (1969)).
45. See id. at 532.
46. 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
47. See id. at 531. Rangel-Gonzales was arrested for illegal reentry into the
United States after deportation. Id. at 529. He filed an affidavit stating that he
had not been informed of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate and that if he
had known of this right, he would have contacted the consulate. Id. at 531.
48. See id. The affidavit of the Mexican Consul General in Seattle stated that
his office would visit a Mexican citizen who requested assistance, assist him in
contacting friends and an attorney, and possibly send a consular official to the
deportation hearing. Id. The court referred to a statement by an experienced
immigration lawyer who stated that, with the appropriate assistance, the
defendant could have obtained a voluntary departure rather than deportation. See
id. Family members, along with legal and social groups, also stated that they
would have assisted the defendant if aware of his situation. Id.
The court concluded that these statements "made a prima facie showing of
prejudice within the meaning of Calderon-Medina." Id. The court found that the
defendant had met the burden of showing that he did not know of his right to
consult with his consulate, that he would have done so had he known, and "that
there was a likelihood that the contact would have resulted in assistance to him in
resisting deportation." Id. at 533.
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immigration context. 49 Courts have often decided that there was
no prejudice to the defendant and then worked "backwards" from
that point to avoid deciding whether an individual right exists.50
Courts have refused to hear Vienna Convention claims which were
not properly raised in a lower court.5' Courts have acted under
the assumption that even if there is an individual right under
Article 36, it is not a constitutional right, and therefore available
remedies are not applicable.5 2 Many courts have looked at the
"plain meaning" of the treaty and, seeing that there was no
specified remedy, declared that a common remedy, such as
exclusion of evidence, did not apply.53
Because the two most notable recent cases in this area of law
have involved the death penalty, 54 a brief examination of
applicable jurisprudence is required. Justice Marshall's opinion in
Ford v. Wainwright55  noted the heightened scrutiny for
49. U.S. courts have been quite reluctant to decide this issue. See, e.g., Breard
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (stating that the Vienna Convention arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest).
Compare United States v. Chucks Emuegbunam, No. 00-1399, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 2001) (stating that the treaty did not create an individually
enforceable right) with Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding, in a case of first impression in that district, that the
Vienna Convention conferred a private right of action of an individual which may
be pursued via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del. Super. Ct.
1999) (finding an individual right to notification and ordering the suppression of
evidence resulting from a tainted confession).
50. See, e.g., Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that
although Texas admitted there was a violation of the Vienna Convention, there was
no evidence of a prejudicial effect); see also Breard, 523 U.S. at 376-77 ('The Vienna
Convention... arguably confers.., an... individual right .... [I]t is extremely
doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of
conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial....
In this action no such showing could even arguably be made.").
51. See infra Part II.C.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (holding that while some treaties may explicitly contain
individually enforceable rights, the Vienna Convention does not explicitly identify
remedies for breach of its terms).
53. See, e.g., Rocha v. Texas, 16 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing
federal decisions in which the common remedies were not applicable since no
remedy was specified and declining to exclude evidence since that court would be
the only jurisdiction in the world excluding evidence obtained in violation of a
treaty). But see Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (suppressing statements obtained without
notifying the defendant of his Vienna Convention rights).
54. See Breard, 523 U.S. 371; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 40 I.L.M. 1069
(June 27, 2001).
55. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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evidentiary factors involved in the death penalty process. 56 In
death penalty proceedings, the "factfinder must have all possible
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it
must determine."5 7 The Supreme Court has held that a State may
not prohibit the capital defendant from submitting any relevant
information. 58
C. Breard v. Greene and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 199659 (AEDPA) to grant law enforcement
additional tools to combat increasing threats of terrorism and to
"speed up" what it perceived to be a slow and drawn-out death
penalty process. 60 The pertinent provision of the Act precludes
federal habeas corpus review for claims that did not first arise in
state court.6
1
In deciding Breard v. Greene,6 2 the Supreme Court applied
the AEDPA and the doctrine of procedural default to a habeas
56. See id. at 414. Marshall's discussion mirrors the "death is different"
holding of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976). The Gregg Court, in
upholding Georgia's death penalty statute, mandated a strict and careful process to
initiate the death penalty. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189-90.
57. Ford, 477 U.S. at 413 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
58. See id.
59. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
2241-2255 and adding 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (Supp. 1996)).
60. See Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive
Petitions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1998). ("[I]n April 1996 Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ... [which] accomplished a decade-long effort to ensure
that a... capital sentence imposed by a state court could be carried out without
awaiting the disruptive, dilatory tactics of counsel for condemned prisoners.")
(citing A Constitutional Amendment for Crime Victims, 1997: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)).
61. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998). A federal habeas
corpus petitioner may not bring a claim without first exhausting "all available state
court remedies." Id. (citing Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, cert. denied 118 S.
Ct. 102, and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). The court stated that since Breard did not raise
his Vienna Convention claim in a Virginia state court, a remedy was unavailable in
a federal proceeding. See id. C'If a state court clearly and expressly bases its
dismissal of a habeas corpus petitioner's claim on a state procedural rule, and that
procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal,
the habeas corpus petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim."
(citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991))).
62. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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corpus petition asserting an Article 36 violation.63 The Court
found that the AEDPA precluded this claim because Breard did
not raise the issue in a state court proceeding. 64 The Court
reasoned that the AEDPA, as an Act of Congress and on equal
footing with a treaty, supercedes language in a prior enacted
treaty inconsistent with the Act. 65 The Supreme Court denied the
request for a stay of execution, which the ICJ had requested66
pending further proceedings in that court. 67 The Supreme Court
took note of the pending ICJ proceeding, but indicated that it was
initiated too late in the process to have bearing on the decision.68
The responsibility for a failure to raise an Article 36 claim in
state proceedings lies in the nature of the violation itself. An
Article 36 violation occurs when the detaining official fails to
inform the defendant of her right to speak with her consulate.
This violation is comparable to the government misrepresenting to
the defendant her rights as a detained individual. Therefore,
without adequate legal advice from the often state-provided
attorney, this claim cannot arise. 69 The failure to bring a Vienna
Convention claim may lie with the defendant's counsel 70 or with an
63. See id. Defendant Breard was convicted of rape and homicide in Virginia.
Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994). Breard filed a federal habeas
corpus petition alleging violation of his rights under Article 36. Breard, 523 U.S. at
373. The Republic of Paraguay, which had become aware of Breard's conviction
sometime after January 1996, filed a separate action seeking declarative and
injunctive relief against the Governor of Virginia. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622,
625 (4th Cir. 1998). The Vienna Convention claim first arose in the habeas corpus
petition and did not arise in the state court proceeding. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
64. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76.
65. See id. at 376-77.
66. See Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9).
67. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. The Supreme Court held that:
[W]ith respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international
treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret
such, it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and
express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State
govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.
Id. The Court then stated that assertions of error which defendant did not raise in
state courts may not provide the basis for federal habeas corpus review. See id. at
376.
68. See id. at 378.
69. It hardly seems logical that a defendant could assert a right to consular
access, part of which is the right to be notified of this right, without first having
knowledge of the right.
70. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (citing
several instances of attorneys representing capital defendants who lacked even the
most basic knowledge of criminal defense or who were so grossly under-funded that
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inadequately funded public defense system.7'
III. The LaGrand Case
The Federal Republic of Germany brought an action against
the United States before the ICJ on its own behalf and on behalf of
two of its citizens.72 The ICJ's jurisdiction is limited to cases
brought by two States or disputes concerning treaties specifically
providing for the ICJ to resolve disputes.73 The ICJ's jurisdiction
rests on the Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol granting the
ICJ jurisdiction to settle disputes arising from interpretations of
the Convention. 74 An ICJ decision is typically only binding as to
the parties and the case before it, but the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention mandates that an ICJ interpretation of the
treaty is authoritative. 75
In 1982, Karl and Walter LaGrand were convicted of murder
and sentenced to death in Arizona. 76 The LaGrands were German
citizens, a fact of which the State of Arizona was aware in 1984, at
the very latest.77 However, it was not until June 1992 that
they were rendered incapable of providing a proper defense).
71. See, e.g., Albert L. Vreeland, II, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutoiy
Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 626, 640 (1991) (citing studies showing that the resources allocated
to public defenders are often grossly "deficient in light of the needs of adequate
representation").
72. LaGrand Case, (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1073-74 (June 27, 2001).
73. See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 11 (3rd ed. 2001) (discussing the ICd's general
jurisdictional limitations).
74. LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1080-85; see also supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text (explaining the procedure concerning the jurisdictional issues of
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention).
75. Compare WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 73, at 11 with supra notes 30-32
and accompanying text. The Optional Protocol conveys an authoritative
interpretation of the Vienna Convention to parties to the Protocol. Optional
Protocol, supra note 7, preamble and art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488.
The United States and Germany are both parties to the Optional Protocol.
LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1076.
76. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987). The brothers were
convicted of murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the first degree,
attempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. Id. The LaGrands were
responsible for stabbing the deceased twenty-four times and stabbing another
multiple times. Id. at 566.
77. There is a dispute as to when the authorities were aware of the LaGrands'
nationality. LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1076. Germany argued that authorities in
Arizona, including probation and immigration officers, knew of the brothers'
citizenship shortly after their arrest. Id. at 1076-77. The United States claimed
the question centered on who was a "competent authority" within the meaning of
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German authorities became aware of the LaGrands' imprisonment
and pending executions. 78  Thereafter, an official from the
Consulate-General of Germany in Los Angeles made several visits
to the brothers in prison.7 9
The United States did concede that it had failed to perform
its obligations under Article 36.80 However, the United States
pointed to the various efforts made to implement treaty
obligations within law enforcement. 8 ' The ICJ noted that, at the
time the LaGrands learned of their rights under the Convention,
the doctrine of procedural default prevented an effective exercise
of those rights.8 2 The ICJ found it immaterial whether or not
Germany would have granted assistance to the brothers or
whether the LaGrands would have accepted such assistance; it
was enough that government action (or inaction) rendered such
assistance impossible.8 3
The ICJ interpreted paragraph 1(b) of Article 36 as creating
an individual right for the detained national to consular
notification.8 4  The ICJ then addressed the application of
Article 36. Id. at 1077. The United States claimed "competent authority" referred
only to the arresting and detaining authorities, who claimed to have become aware
of the brothers' German citizenship in late 1984, and not "other authorities." Id.
78. Id. at 1077. The LaGrands, who became aware of their consular rights from
other sources and not from Arizona authorities, contacted the German Consulate.
See id. The German government was unaware that the State of Arizona had
knowledge of the LaGrands' citizenship until eight days before the scheduled
execution of Walter LaGrand on March 3, 1999. Federal Republic of Germany v.
United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1077.
80. Id. at 1076-77.
81. See Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America,
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), paras. 20-23 (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguspleadings/igus - ipleading-countermemoriaLus-2000
0327.htm. The United States pointed to various State Department efforts to gain
compliance. See id. at para. 20; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text
(describing the handbook provided to law enforcement officers regarding consular
notification).
82. See LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1084. The ICJ stated that the United States
could not rely on this preclusion doctrine to defend itself against a wrong which it
had committed. See id. It was also undisputed that, as soon as the LaGrands had
learned of their rights under the Convention, they promptly sought to plead those
rights. Id.
83. See id. at 1086-87. Germany, in fact, insisted that it had given the
LaGrands assistance in raising the Vienna Convention claim and that it helped the
LaGrands' attorneys investigate their childhood in Germany for mitigating
evidence. Id. at 1077.
84. See id. at 1086-87. The ICJ noted the specific text of Article 36(1)(b), which
states, "[tlhe said authorities [referring to the detaining authorities] shall inform
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph." Id.
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procedural default in this case.8 5 The ICJ stated that a procedural
rule could not be used to prevent "full effect [from being] given to
the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are
intended."8 6  The ICJ attached significance to the fact that the
United States' Article 36 violation resulted in the issue not arising
in the required timely fashion.8 7 By the time the LaGrands were
aware of their consular rights, the preclusion doctrine rendered
the issue defaulted.8 8 Accordingly, the ICJ held:
[B]y not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the
light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the
convictions and sentences of the LaGrand brothers after
violations referred to ... had been established, the United
States of America breached its obligation to the Federal
Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention.8 9
The ICJ concluded that the United States must allow for review
and reconsideration in all cases involving noncitizen detainees
"subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to
severe penalties" and whose Convention rights had not been
observed.9 0
IV. Protecting the Individual Defendant From the Undue
Prejudice of an Article 36 Violation
The LaGrand decision did not announce an interpretation of
the Convention that the United States had not debated and
accepted during the Convention or its subsequent Senate
ratification. 91 The fundamental precepts of the treaty are not in
(quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4, art. 36(1)(b), 21
U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292). The ICJ stated that this sentence specifically
states that an individual right exists within the text of subparagraph (b). See id.
The ICJ noted Germany's assertion that the duties imposed by Article 36 may be at
the level of a "human right," but the ICJ did not find it necessary to decide
whether consular access was indeed a "human right." Id.
85. See id. at 1090. The ICJ did not find fault in the premise of the procedural
default rule per se, but in its application to the case at hand. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1090. The ICJ noted that the violation deprived the LaGrands of
private representation that the German consulate could have provided at an earlier
stage of the proceedings. See id.
88. See id. The ICJ stated that the procedural default application in this case
prevented "full effect" from being given to the Article 36 rights. Id.
89. Id. at 1102 (concerning final judgment of the court regarding the procedural
default issue).
90. Id. at 1100.
91. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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question; rather, it is the failure to address violations of these
obligations. 92  The decision announces only the elementary
principle that appropriate measures are necessary to address
Convention violations in order to minimize the likelihood of a
future breach.93
The United States' failure to give full effect to Vienna
Convention obligations continues after the LaGrand ruling.94 The
courts and the defense bar must take action to safeguard consular
protection for noncitizen detainees. Without the possibility of
impairment to the specific case or to the law enforcement body,
there is no reason, other than goodwill, for law enforcement to
make an effort to comply with treaty obligations. It follows that
the most effective measures to ensure compliance are those that
create incentives for law enforcement officials to take the
necessary precautions that ensure the protection of an individual
detainee's right to consular access.
The ICJ ruling requires that appropriate measures be taken
to properly address Article 36 violations. 95  This calls for
substantive and, at times, remedial measures. The efforts the
United States has made to ensure compliance with Convention
obligations have been only prophylactic in nature and confer no
substantive remedies or incentives for law enforcement
compliance .96
A. The LaGrand Decision and U.S. Law Are Not Mutually
Exclusive
On its face, the ICJ ruling that the United States cannot use
the doctrine of procedural default to preclude an Article 36 claim
seems to be in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
Breard.97 The ICJ ruling arguably may not be, however, in direct
92. See LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1100.
93. See id. at 1101.
94. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
95. See LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1101.
96. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The State Department efforts
are entirely aimed at educating law enforcement officials on the necessity of
consular notification. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. The Court's application of
the procedural default doctrine to the Breard case came in a situation in which the
defendant offered no proof of prejudice resulting from the violation. See Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). In contrast, in LaGrand, Germany offered to provide
mitigating evidence that may have affected the brothers' sentence. LaGrand, 40
I.L.M. at 1086.
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conflict. The Breard Court applied the AEDPA to the status of
then-existing Article 36 interpretation. 98 The Court did leave open
the possibility for further consideration subsequent to, and in light
of, an ICJ ruling. 99
The text of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the laws
and regulations of the signatory nations must give full effect to the
purposes and rights stipulated therein.10 0 It therefore violates the
Vienna Convention terms to apply the AEDPA so as to preclude an
Article 36 claim from arising, thereby inhibiting possible remedial
measures. Creation of a judicial exception for Article 36 claims
need not conflict with the principle of stare decisis ("let the
decision stand"), since future litigation will occur in light of the
ICJ interpretation. 101
The Vienna Convention, as a ratified treaty to which the
United States is a party, is the law of the land, 10 2 and individual
rights created by a treaty are applicable with the same force as
statutory rights flowing from legislation enacted by Congress.
10 3
The Court, by stating that Article 36 arguably conveys a right to
the individual and expressing its interest in the scheduled ICJ
proceedings, left themselves with an opportunity to further
consider this issue. 104 In the future, the Court must take into
account the specific delegation to the ICJ of the authority to
interpret the terms of the treaty.10 5 It would be entirely against
the intent of the Article's framers and that of the Senate, by
consenting to the treaty, to ignore the ICJ interpretation. 0 6 The
ICJ ruling should persuade the Court to recognize an individual
right to consular access, thereby giving respect to the ruling and
98. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. At the time, there was no
authoritative interpretation as to whether Article 36 created individual rights.
99. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378 (noting that it was unfortunate that the ICJ
proceedings had not occurred prior to the decision).
100. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at
100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-94.
101. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. See Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) and Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
104. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
105. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 35-37, 73-75 and accompanying text. It is particularly
instructive of the intent of the framers and of the U.S. representatives that the
United States supported the ICJ's jurisdiction over the Convention given the
United States' long-standing aversion to granting an international court
jurisdiction over its affairs.
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full effect to the treaty obligations.
The ICJ interpretation that the AEDPA cancels out
conflicting text within the Convention only seems to consider
Congress' intentions of the broad purpose of the AEDPA and
assumes Congress intended the AEDPA to supercede all
preexisting law. 0 7 It is extremely doubtful that Congress could
have intended to withdraw from this treaty and therefore expose
U.S. citizens abroad to the possible harms that the treaty was
designed to avert.108 Without direct evidence of contrary intent
from Congress, an interpretation that the AEDPA supercedes the
Vienna Convention would produce an "absurd result" contrary to
the public good. 0 9 Given the legislative history of the treaty and
the ratification, it is evident that a great deal was at stake and
that Congress has a strong interest in protecting individual U.S.
citizens in foreign countries." 0 In agreeing to the terms of the
Vienna Convention, the United States is obligated to observe these
same interests that other nations have in protecting their citizens
abroad."'
A court reviewing an Article 36 claim should note that the
State and Justice Departments' interpretations of Article 36
affirmatively convey an obligation to inform the detained national
107. The Congressional debate surrounding the AEDPA was silent on the
Vienna Convention. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H3604-05 (1996) (demonstrating no
congressional intent to withdraw from the Vienna Convention).
108. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. The legislative history of
both the Convention and Congressional debate are quite instructive on the intent of
the framers and subsequent Senate ratification. The United States recognized
early the importance of consular access and was reluctant to enter an agreement
which would leave U.S. citizens abroad without the protection the government
could supply and the citizens would expect. See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text (noting the importance of consular access to the United States).
109. Congress could not have intended to leave U.S. citizens abroad without the
protections afforded by Article 36. The Court should not assume, without evidence
of specific congressional intent, and especially in light of the State Department's
acknowledgement of the importance of notification, that Congress would withdraw
from the Vienna Convention. This would produce the kind of "absurd" result which
courts should avoid. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-
30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that an interpretation of a statute, despite
the plain meaning of its text, which produces an "absurd" result would not be
proper absent clear evidence of Congressional intent).
110. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
111. Unilateral and subjective action would breach the terms of the Vienna
Convention, rendering the treaty ineffective. See generally Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, paras. 1-2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346
(defining remedies available to countries for a material breach of treaty terms).
Customary international law allows for "suspending the operation of the treaty in
whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting state." Id.
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of his right to consular notification." 2  The State Department's
interpretation should receive Chevron 1 3 deference absent a clear
statement from Congress to the contrary. 114 In granting deference,
courts should give ample weight to the inherently prejudicial effect
of an Article 36 violation.
115
B. Enforcement of Vienna Convention Rights in U.S. Courts
An interpretation that an individual right exists in Article 36
raises this related issue: an individual right exists, but there is no
available avenue for enforcement or review." 6 Redress might be
available through a case-by-case evaluation of the facts to
determine the prejudicial effect of the violation on the defendant's
constitutional rights. For example, if a defendant whose Article 36
rights have been violated cannot adequately give a valid waiver of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, then
suppression of the resulting confession would be in order." 7 In
this instance, Article 36 rights would be enforced to serve the
Article's proper function of ensuring that a noncitizen defendant
receives equal treatment of the laws within the United States.
The apparent pattern in federal habeas corpus petitions
requesting relief for Article 36 violations is that the defendant did
not know of his right to consular notification until it was too late
for the defendant's consulate to take any meaningful action on his
112. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
113. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
114. See id. at 843-44. Absent a clear statement from Congress to the contrary,
a court should give great weight to an agency construction of a statute made by an
agency charged with its implementation. Id. This same canon of interpretation is
applicable to State Department treaty interpretations. See, e.g., El Al Isr. Airlines
v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) C'Respect is ordinarily due the
reasonable view of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an
international treaty.").
115. This "inherent prejudice" refers to the disadvantages placed upon the
noncitizen defendant by failing to notify him of his consular rights. The denial of
an opportunity to seek an avenue of assistance expressly provided for in Article 36
is arguably prejudicial to a defendant. Cf. infra note 144 (citing an example of a
noncitizen detainee unable to comprehend his Miranda rights).
116. There are no procedures established for review or enforcement of
Convention violations, at least not in matters directly related to a criminal
proceeding. At least one court has recognized a cause of action for civil damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). For a discussion of Standt, see infra notes 152-157 and
accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (explaining the exclusionary
rule).
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behalf. 1 8 Whether fault lies with the attorneys representing the
defendant at the state trial or with the appellate courts, it stems
from government misconduct. 119 Currently the burden of this
misconduct falls on the defendant, who must bear the full force of
the law.
The failure to notify a defendant of her right to consular
assistance effectively leaves her without consulate assistance.
Without knowledge of the right, it follows that a defendant cannot
raise this issue. If the defendant's attorney is not aware of or does
not raise the issue, the defendant faces the possibility of
procedural default, thereby forever losing any claim she might
have had. 120 Denying a defendant a forum in which to address this
issue is repugnant, not only to the ICJ opinion, but also to decency
and justice.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Prosecutorial
Misconduct as Grounds for Habeas Corpus Relief
If a defendant's attorney failed to recognize the Article 36
violation at a time when consulate help would have been
advantageous, or knew of the violation but did not raise the issue,
the defendant may be able to use ineffective assistance of counsel
as ground for habeas corpus relief.121 An ineffective assistance of
counsel claim must show-that counsel made "errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that this deficiency
rendered the outcome of the proceedings unreliable. 122 Ignoring
118. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d
515 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving defendants who were unaware of their right to
consular access until long after conviction).
119. The United States, in ratifying the Vienna Convention, has specifically
agreed to notify all detainees within its jurisdiction of their consular rights. See
supra note 31-32 and accompanying text. This obligation serves, inter alia, as a
foundation to allow the detainee access to his nation's consulate. Therefore,
without the government's failure to comply, there would be no contestable issue.
120. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
121. There is a strong argument that an attorney failing to recognize or
investigate this issue has denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel.
Although the ineffective assistance may stem from the lack of resources allocated to
the appointed representation, see supra note 70, or from the lack of a particular
knowledge of Vienna Convention issues, the defendant is nonetheless denied the
full benefit of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See supra note 39 (discussing
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
122. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The test's first prong
gives great deference to the attorney's professional judgment. Id. at 689-90. The
second prong imposes an affirmative duty on the defendant to prove actual
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the necessity and importance of the consular assistance cannot be
characterized as tactical lawyering, but rather as a failure to
access resources possibly available to the defendant.
The defendant who learns of his Article 36 rights after
conviction could also argue that prosecutorial misconduct played a
part in his conviction or sentencing. 123  The prosecution has, or
should have, knowledge of Article 36 obligations. 124 This failure to
disclose the violation and to advise the defendant of his rights may
prevent discovery of exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 125
2. The Impact of Article 36 Violations on Sentencing and
the Death Penalty
In capital cases, the sentencing phase of the trial is crucial,
essentially determining whether the convicted defendant lives or
dies. Here, the defendant has a constitutional right to bring forth
any mitigating evidence. 126 It is evident that in the case of the
noncitizen defendant, his consulate has access to records and
evidence relating to his background that might otherwise be
unobtainable by him.127
prejudice. Id. at 693. This affirmative duty does not, however, require the
defendant to prove that the deficient representation more likely than not
influenced the outcome of the proceeding. Id.
123. State rules for attorney conduct have regulations requiring prosecutors to
disclose information relating to the defendant's guilt or mitigating circumstances.
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.34(b) (1999), which states:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall
make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to a defendant who
has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or
other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce the punishment.
Id.
124. See Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America,
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), paras. 20-23 (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguspleadings/igus-ipleading-countermemorial-us-2000
0327.htm (noting State Department distribution of information on notification
obligations to law enforcement officials, including prosecutors).
125. See supra note 123. New York state rules, for example, refer to the
"existence of evidence" that may "negate the guilt" or "mitigate the degree" or
"reduce the punishment." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.34(b)
(1999). The consulate could provide evidence unattainable by the defendant's
attorney in this country.
126. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-68 (1976). In order to not offend
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment, a court must
employ strict application guidelines and give the opportunity for mitigating
evidence to be presented before a sentence may be passed. See id; see also McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990) ("The Constitution requires States to
allow consideration of mitigating evidence in capital cases.").
127. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Faulder v. Johnson, 81
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment
to require that no barrier to the consideration of mitigating
evidence may exist in a death penalty case. 128 A defendant is
denied the opportunity to bring forth relevant mitigating evidence
when an Article 36 violation precludes the defendant from
bringing forth such evidence before the procedural bar has been
raised. 129 In the capital punishment context, the failure to provide
a forum to consider mitigating evidence would violate the Eighth
Amendment's scrutiny requirements for application of the death
penalty. 130
If the defendant brings a habeas corpus petition asserting an
Article 36 violation and proof that her consulate is able to provide
sufficient support for the existence of mitigating or possibly
exculpatory evidence that is unattainable without the consulate's
assistance, a court should permit the evidence to be presented. In
doing so, the court must note that the cause for the defendant's
inability to provide the evidence earlier stems from the State's
denial of a statutorily created individual right and must address
the issue as one of government misconduct.
It is also of note how the basic facts of the Breard case may
have influenced the Court's decision. 13 Justice Blackmun once
observed that "easy cases make bad law."' 32 Arguably, the Court
was not willing to give Breard an opportunity to delay the
punishment and instead, left that decision to the Virginia
governor. 133 The Court noted that no discernable benefit to the
defendant Breard would have come out of further proceedings, 134
and therefore it would be possible to evaluate the decision in terms
of judicial economy. If the facts had been such that there was a
more tangible prejudice to Breard from the violation, such as
hampering his opportunity to present mitigating evidence, the
F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Canadian government requires the
Canadian consul to "obtain case-related information if requested by the arrestee to
the extent that it cannot otherwise be obtained by the arrestee").
128. See McKoy, 494 U.S. at 442.
129. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
131. Overwhelming evidence showed that Breard had committed an extremely
brutal murder. See Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998).
132. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (observing that Holmes' observation that "hard cases make bad law" is
applicable to the obvious and simple cases as well).
133. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
134. See id. at 377-78.
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Court may have reached a different conclusion.
In a capital case, courts could give substance to compliance
efforts by providing a hearing to a defendant whose Convention
rights were violated and allowing the sending State's consulate a
full opportunity to bring forth information bearing on the case. If
the sending State's consulate can bring forth evidence which would
have bearing upon any part of the case, at any stage of the
proceedings, then further action is warranted to assure that the
defendant suffers no prejudice resulting from the violation.
3. Suppression of Evidence Resulting from Violations of
Article 36
Evidence that is derived from government misconduct that
violates certain constitutional rights is labeled "fruit of the
poisonous tree" and is not admissible in a criminal proceeding.
135
Such evidence is deemed inadmissible in order to secure future
compliance by the state actor with constitutional requirements.
136
While it has not been the practice to include violations of Article
36 in the list of violations warranting suppression of evidence, 137 it
is nonetheless possible. 138
One argument used to deny exclusion of evidence in violation
of Article 36 is that the framers of the Vienna Convention could
not have taken into account the distinct characteristics of the U.S.
legal system when drafting the Article. 139 This argument fails to
135. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp. 843, 852-55 (M.D. Fla.
1977) (providing a detailed history of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine).
Evidence seized or confessions obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights are inadmissible as evidence against him. Id. This doctrine not only covers
evidence directly obtained from unlawful circumstances but also information
obtained from that evidence. Id. at 852 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920)). The State has the burden to prove that evidence
is properly obtained. United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1097 (2000) (citing
United States v. Johns, 891 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir. 1989)).
136. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491-99 (1966) (holding that
evidence obtained using coercive techniques or in disregard of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel is inadmissible); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
648 (1961) ('[C]onviction[s] by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts .... [S]uch
evidence 'shall not be used at all."' (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
392 (1914) and Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392)).
137. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999).
139. See supra note 10; see also Rocha v. Texas, 16 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999) (stating that no other jurisdiction in the world excludes evidence for a treaty
violation).
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consider that the language of the Article itself requires the
ratifying nations to give full effect to the treaty within their
respective legal systems.140
In order to grant relief, courts hearing Article 36 claims have
uniformly required, yet rarely found, that actual prejudice result
from the Vienna Convention violation.14' Courts treat Article 36
violations as being somewhat removed from other obligations. 142
They look first for prejudice, and then, if no prejudice is found,
look no further. 43 The specific circumstances surrounding the
initial arrest and detention may provide attorneys with useful
background to establish a constitutional violation.144 An attorney
who recognizes that there has been a delay in informing, or a
failure to inform, the defendant of his Article 36 rights must
immediately bring a suppression motion based on that violation. 145
Although violation of a treaty right is the equivalent of a
statutory, not constitutional, right, 46 there is the possibility that
an infringement upon constitutional rights results. If so, an
Article 36 violation may be included in the "totality of the
circumstances" which courts are required to examine when
determining the voluntariness of a confession, for example. 147
140. See supra note 31.
141. See supra notes 45, 49-50 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 44, 48-49 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. As it appears, the courts look to
the treaty violation as the "primary violation" and decide either that there was no
prejudice resulting from the Article 36 violation or, if there was prejudice, the
defendant does not have an individual right to enforce the violation, and the
analysis ends.
144. See People v. Medina, No. 97 CR 307, Division B (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1998),
http://www.state.co.us/defenders/Library/Mata-Medina/Antonio%20Mata-Medina%
200rder.html. Defendant. Medina was read his Miranda warning in both English
and Spanish. Id. When asked if he wanted an attorney, the defendant indicated
that he wanted an attorney, but could not afford one. Id. He did state that he
wanted to speak to a "judge or someone." Id. It is clear from these statements that
he did not understand that he was entitled to have representation provided for him.
It is also a permissible inference that in stating that he "wanted to talk to a judge
or someone" he invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nevertheless, the
judge found that the statements he made to interrogators, and the derivative
information was admissible as evidence. See id.
145. See id. In Medina, the defendant was arguably denied both his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because he did not understand the nature of these rights. A court
examines the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if, for example, a
confession was voluntary. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993).
146. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
147. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693-94. The potential elements of the totality of the
circumstances include: "police coercion, the length of the interrogation; its location;
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While a court may not find a citizen of the United Kingdom unduly
prejudiced by an Article 36 violation, an immigrant worker from
rural Mexico may not have the ability to place his Miranda
warning in the proper context, where a waiver of these rights may
be deemed reliable.
The noncitizen defendant, possibly unaware of U.S. legal
customs and without the assistance of her consulate, may not be
able to comprehend these constitutional rights and thus grant a
legitimate waiver of these rights. 148 It is axiomatic that one
cannot give a valid waiver of rights that one does not understand.
The fear of suppression of evidence would persuade law
enforcement officials to see the necessity of complying with the
treaty and would thereby advance compliance. 149 An argument
that suppression will induce law enforcement compliance with
Article 36 obligations is strong in instances where compliance will
assure protection of the noncitizen defendant's constitutional
rights. Adding an Article 36 violation as a factor in determining
the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if a confession was
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment would not be an
improper extension of the doctrine, but an application which would
serve the purpose of deterring future improper conduct.
its continuity; the defendant's maturity; education; physical condition; and mental
health." Id. at 693-94 (citations omitted).
148. See State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 13-14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999). The court
noted that:
[When a foreign national is arrested, especially one who is unable to
speak the language of the receiving State, it is likely that he will be
unfamiliar with the receiving State's criminal justice system, and may be
unable to defend himself, not just due to ignorance, but also due to possible
discrimination based on his national origin.
Id.; see also supra note 1 (demonstrating the apprehension the noncitizen may have
toward the criminal justice system resulting from experience in her native land).
149. See supra note 10. In United States v. Lombera-Camnorlinga, 206 F.3d 882
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the majority held that suppression is not a proper remedy
for Article 36 violations. See id. at 886. They noted the effect of the suppression
remedy on future violations of the right. See id. at 887. They did not consider it
appropriate in this instance, as an individual right created under the Vienna
Convention was not a constitutional right, for which suppression was an available
remedy. See id. at 886. The court also stated its belief that the State Department
was the proper vehicle for treaty implementation and not the judicial system. See
id. The dissent, however, in characterizing the State Department's policy toward
the treaty's enforcement as essentially cosmetic, stated that a confession obtained
in violation of the Vienna Convention should be suppressed like any other
confession obtained improperly in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 892-
94.
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4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a Remedy for Article 36 Violations
Section 1983 of title 42 the United States Code provides a
cause of action for "any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof' for deprivation of "any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by
a person acting under the color of state law.15 0 Under the statute,
liability is also extended to municipalities or other local
government entities for deprivations of federal rights, in some
circumstances. 151
The recent federal district court decision of Standt v. New
York 152 illustrates the possibility for action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to remedy a violation of the Vienna Convention. 153 The Standt
court, determining that Article 36 creates an individual right,15 4
found the treaty to be "self-executing"'155 and therefore giving rise
to a cause of action under § 1983.156 The court found the denial of
consular rights was a compensable injury under the statute. 157
Law enforcement officials, aware of the possibility of civil
actions, will have incentive to assure that those within their
custody are notified of their consular rights at the earliest possible
moment. The specter of civil damages for noncompliance may
serve as a powerful weapon for achieving compliance with Vienna
Convention obligations. The successful § 1983 action may be of
little comfort to the defendant facing a harsh criminal sentence,
but it provides a powerful tool for civil liberties organizations to
bring claims on behalf of detainees with the objective of achieving
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
151. Monell v. Dep't-of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
152. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
153. See id. at 422-30. It is necessary to differentiate the action brought by Mr.
Standt, as an individual, from the § 1983 claim brought by the Republic of
Paraguay, which the Supreme Court rejected in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998). Breard explained that "Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any
'person within the jurisdiction' of the United States for the deprivation 'of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' Id. at 378
(emphasis added). Paraguay is not a person within meaning of § 1983 and,
therefore, the statute does not apply to it. Id.
154. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425-27.
155. Id. at 423. A treaty is self-executing if "it provides rights to individuals
rather than merely setting out the obligations of signatories." Id. at 423 n.3 (citing
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (Butzner, J., concurring)). A determination
that a treaty is self-executing creates "standing" in the individual plaintiff to assert
a cause of action. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 431.
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compliance with treaty obligations.
C. Education as a Tool to Protect Vienna Convention Rights
Despite the State Department's widespread dissemination of
literature on the issue, the fact is that Article 36 violations
continue to occur.15s These continuing violations create an
obligation for the defense bar to take the initiative in educating its
members on how to recognize and pursue litigation on such
violations. It would take little time in a Continuing Legal
Education course to bring these issues to the attention of the
defense bar. A well-informed defense bar would be much more
likely to raise Article 36 issues at an early stage and avoid
procedural barriers. 159
Conclusion
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations did not create
an obligation that interferes with the procedures of the U.S.
judicial system. It merely provides a means to allow a nation to
provide assistance on behalf of its citizens abroad and for those
citizens to get such assistance. An Article 36 violation may deny
the noncitizen defendant the same constitutional protections to
which a U.S. citizen is entitled when in custody.
The attorney charged with advocating on behalf of the
criminal defendant must inquire immediately, as a matter of
practice, of the defendant's nationality in order to maintain an
effective defense and, in more severe cases, such as those involving
the death penalty, effectively bring forth mitigating evidence.
Timely and relevant application of principles of criminal law to
Article 36 issues will provide an opportunity for the defendant to
gain the valuable advice and assistance of his consular officials.
The judicial system is charged with ensuring protection of the
rights procured by the legislative and executive branches. It is the
158. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (noting the continuing
Convention violations).
159. It is noteworthy that a large number of foreign nationals are represented by
state-provided attorneys. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (Nov. 2000) 9
tbl.19 (stating that 69.7% of noncitizen state prison inmates and 58.7% of
noncitizen federal prison inmates had appointed counsel). The entity whose laws
the defendant faces and who denied defendant consular rights is the same party
that provides the defense which, whether by lack of information or funding, fails to
litigate the Article 36 claim. It is this fact upon which the international community
may look with distrust.
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judicial system, insulated from political pressures, which must
apply established principles of law to ensure non-prejudicial
application of the laws. This will assure protection of the right to
consular access and all other rights. Through the use of
established remedial measures, the judiciary can secure the rights
granted by the Vienna Convention.
There is a final consideration, extraneous to the individual
rights of the detained noncitizen to consular access, which the
judicial system should take into account. The United States, now
more than ever, needs to portray itself as a complete and
cooperative member of the international community. As a world
leader, the United States may be compelled to take unilateral
action on international affairs. There may be a time and a place
for a nation to act alone, to take the initiative, and make a stand
apart from the rest of the world. Denying a detained individual
consular assistance furthers no appreciable goal when balanced
against the loss of credibility to the United States as a defender of
human rights resulting from infringement of an individual right
deemed so important as to require codification and agreement by
each of the parties to the Vienna Convention.
[Vol. 20:313
